


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7. Turkey: Inonu has persuaded opposition to soft-pedal amnesty demands for imprisoned Menderes supporters. (*Page v*)



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10. Argentina: Armed forces press Frondizi for changes in foreign and domestic policies. (*Page vii*)



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
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
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Thailand: Thai dissatisfaction with SEATO has crystallized to the point where the prime minister is considering conditions under which Thailand might withdraw from the organization. Foreign Minister Thanat has told the American ambassador in Bangkok that, unless SEATO voting procedures

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are amended by early March to eliminate the unanimity requirement for military action, he will publicly denounce the organization as a "deception" which provides no security for Thailand. Thanat said that he desires "some form of Thai neutral policy outside of SEATO" with continued guarantees for Thailand's security. Neither he nor Prime Minister Sarit, who told the ambassador that "SEATO is useless," is satisfied by American guarantees given through SEATO. They would prefer unilateral commitments.)

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Turkey: Prime Minister Inonu has persuaded opposition civilians to soft-pedal their demands for an amnesty for Menderes supporters--demands which were threatening to provoke a new military coup. He appears now to be using his substantial prestige to win military support for his government.

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However, while general public awareness of military plotting has hampered the conspirators, it has also made it difficult for Inonu to build confidence in the civilian regime.

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[REDACTED]

***Argentina:** The armed forces have given President Frondizi a virtual ultimatum demanding changes in his foreign and domestic policies. Their demands were triggered by Argentina's abstention on the Punta del Este resolution to exclude Cuba from the OAS. The military are reluctant to disrupt constitutional order by ousting Frondizi but apparently are now insisting on various steps including a break in diplomatic relations with Cuba, the resignation of Foreign Minister Carcano, and a more effective crackdown on Peronista political activity.

[REDACTED]

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**SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES**

(Available during the preceding week)

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[Probable trends in Soviet military assistance: availability of arms and equipment; extent of aid to Bloc and non-Bloc countries. U.S.I.B. SNIE 11-7-62. 24 Jan 62.] [redacted]

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[Consequences of Algerian partition: an evaluation of probable further French-Moslem conflict, Bloc exploitation, and effects on NATO and the UN. U.S.I.B. SNIE 62-62. 24 Jan 62.] [redacted]

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Tension in Argentina

Frondizi is facing one of the most severe of the numerous crises resulting from military pressure during his three and a half years in office. Most of these crises have been related to the armed forces' insistence that Frondizi maintain strong measures against a resurgence of Peronista influence and take strong anti-Communist measures. Before the OAS conference at Punta del Este the military advised Frondizi to support a strong anti-Castro position, and they were deeply angered by Argentina's abstention.

Air Force and Navy leaders seem to be taking the initiative. Military officials met during the evening of 31 January and reportedly demanded that Frondizi break relations with Cuba within 48 hours. According to Air Force contacts of the US Embassy in Buenos Aires, the Air Force and the Navy did not have the complete support of Army Secretary Fraga for their demands as of 31 January, but did have the firm support of 16 important army generals. The three military secretaries spoke jointly with Frondizi on 1 February, which suggests that Fraga now has given his full support. The flavor of military opinion was reflected in the conservative daily Correo de la Tarde, which in an editorial entitled "We Are Ashamed," concluded: "Restitution must be made, and in our shame we beat at the doors of the government house... to demand reparation commensurate with such an insult."

The US Embassy believes that Frondizi may be prepared to break relations with Cuba to ease military pressure and at the same time substantiate Argentina's argument that its position taken at the Punta del Este meeting was purely juridical. Responding to the military demands for more effective action against the Peronistas, the interior minister has announced that ex-dictator Peron could not be a candidate for any elective office because of outstanding criminal charges. [REDACTED]

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

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